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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Gabriel Torres was convicted in one case after a jury trial of being an inmate in
possession of a dangerous weapon. In a separate case, Mr. Torres pied guilty to one
count of aggravated assault. He received an aggregate unified sentence of five years,
with two and one-half years fixed.

On appeal, he contends that the district court

violated his right to due process by incorrectly instructing the jury on the elements of
possession of a dangerous weapon, and further contends that his aggregate sentence
represents an abuse of the district court's discretion, as it is excessive given any view of
the facts.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Supreme Court Docket No. 40198 (Canyon County district court case number
2011-20199 (hereinafter, the dangerous weapon case) and Supreme Court Docket No.
40199 (Canyon County district court case number 2012-6406 (hereinafter, the
aggravated assault case) have been consolidated for appellate purposes. (R., p.291.)
In the dangerous weapon case, on the afternoon of May 10, 2011, during a
routine search of Mr. Torres' cell in county jail, Deputy Daniel Combs located three extra
rolls of toilet paper, one regular hard cased pen and two inmate pens wrapped with
paper. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.) Also found inside an
envelope containing legal paperwork was the handle of a plastic spark.

(PSI, p.2.)

When Mr. Torres returned to his cell and was questioned, he said that he had found the
broken spark handle.

(PSI, p.2.)

Mr. Torres was charged by indictment with

possession of a dangerous weapon by an inmate. (R., pp.8-9.)
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At trial, Deputy Combs testified that on May 10, 2011, he was conducting a
routine search of Mr. Torres' cell.

(Trial Tr., p.153, L.23 - p.154, L.1.)

He was

searching for items of contraband, "anything extra, anything that the jail does not issue
to that inmate." (Trial Tr., p.139, L.11 - p.141, L.2.) In Mr. Torres' cell, Deputy Combs
found extra toilet paper, a hard case pen, and a spark handle. (Trial Tr., p.141, Ls.4-5.)
Deputy Combs concluded that it appeared that Mr. Torres was hoarding items. (Trial
Tr., p.150, Ls.20-22.) Deputy Combs described the item at issue as being a spark, with
the spark portion cut off and the remaining handle as having been "sharpened to a
point." (Trial Tr., p.144, Ls.7-11.) A spark was issued to each inmate during meal time
and was then picked up by the deputy who took the meal tray from the inmate. (Trial
Tr., p.146, Ls.10-13.)

Deputy Combs also testified that the point on the sharpened

spark handle was not any sharper than what would be found on the tine of the intact
spark. (Trial Tr., p.149, Ls.19-25.) Deputy Combs testified that, based on his training
and experience, the broken spark handle was a "dangerous weapon." (Trial Tr., p.145,
Ls.20-23.)
At the time of the incident, inmates received a spark with their meals, but then
they had to return the item to be washed. (Trial Tr., p.150, L.23-p.151, L.3.) Deputy
Combs testified that the sparks were collected after the meal so that they could be
washed and reused, not for security reasons.

(Trial Tr., p.151, Ls.7-19.)

After the

incident, the jail commissary began selling inmates sparks for $0.33. (Trial Tr., p.151,
Ls.20-24.) The sparks being sold were of a thinner, softer material than the spark at
issue. (Trial Tr., p.151, Ls.24-25.) Items purchased from the commissary could be kept
in an inmate's cell. (Trial Tr., p.153, Ls.3-6.) Further, at the time of the incident, the jail
sold items through its commissary that needed to be stirred-items such as tea and
2

cappuccino-but did not sell any utensils which could be used to stir such items. (Trial
Tr., p.152, L.12- p.153, L.2.)
The jury found Mr. Torres guilty of possession of a dangerous weapon by an
inmate. (R., p.155.)
In the aggravated assault case, a fight amongst six inmates occurred. (5/22/12
Tr., p.4, Ls.18-19.) Mr. Torres was involved in the fight, although he was not the person
who threw the first punch. (6/27/12 Tr., p.126, Ls.3-4.) The fight was brief and did not
involve any weapons.

(6/27/12 Tr., p.126, Ls.10-13.) A superceding indictment was

filed charging Mr. Torres and five other individuals with rioting. (R., pp.209-210.) A part
II of the superseding indictment added a gang enhancement. (R., pp.211-212.)
As part of a plea agreement, Mr. Torres pied guilty to aggravated assault (as
charged by an amended indictment) and, in exchange, the State agreed to recommend
a concurrent sentence with the sentence imposed in the dangerous weapon case.
(6/26/12 Tr., p.61, Ls.5-19, 6/27/12 Tr., p.73, Ls.10-16; R., pp.234-239.) At sentencing,
the State recommended a sentence of three years fixed, followed by two years
indeterminate on each charge, to be run concurrently. (6/27/12 Tr., p.120, Ls.1-9.) The
defense asked that the district court sentence Mr. Torres to serve five years unified, with
one year fixed on each charge, but either place Mr. Torres on probation or retain
jurisdiction over him.

(6/27/12 Tr., p.131, Ls.3-22.) The district court imposed upon

Mr. Torres a five year sentence, with one and one-half years fixed, on the possession of
a dangerous weapon charge, and on the aggravated assault charge, the district court
sentenced Mr. Torres to a unified sentence of five years, with two and one-half years
fixed, to be served concurrently.

(6/27/12 Tr., p.143, L.19 - p.144, L.7, p.149, L.6;

R, pp.176-177, 275-276.)
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Mr. Torres then filed timely I.C.R. 35 Motion seeking a reduction of his sentences
(hereinafter, Rule 35). (R., pp.192-193, 292-293.) The district court denied Mr. Torres's

Rule 35 motion without a hearing. (Order Denying Motion for Reduction of Sentence
Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on August 29, 2013.)
Mr. Torres appeals from the judgments of conviction. 1 (R., pp.178-180, 188-191, 278280, 286-289.)

On appeal, Mr. Torres does not challenge the denial of his Rule 35 motion. The
district court found that there was no new or additional information filed in support of the
Rule 35 motion. (Order Denying Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R.
35, p.3, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on August 29, 2013.) The Idaho
Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must
show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion. State v.
Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). "An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion
cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the presentation
of new information. Id.
1
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ISSUES

1.

Did the district court err by incorrectly instructing the jury on the elements of
possession of a dangerous weapon?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an aggregate sentence
of five years, with two and one-half years fixed, upon Mr. Torres following his
plea of guilty to one count of aggravated assault and his conviction for one count
of possession of a dangerous weapon?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Failing To Instruct The Jury On The Elements Of
Possession Of A Dangerous Weapon
A.

Introduction
The jury was incorrectly instructed on the elements of possession of a dangerous

weapon - the jury was instructed that the State must prove, inter alia, that "the
defendant, Gabriel Torres, while an inmate of the Canyon County Jail did possess a

dangerous weapon, to-wit: a sharpened plastic eating utensi/." 2 (R., p.146 (emphasis
added).) Because the jury was informed that a sharpened plastic eating utensil was a
dangerous weapon, the italicized language removed any requirement that the State
prove that the object found was in fact a dangerous weapon, an element of the crime,
thereby violating Mr. Torres' right to due process.

Jury Instruction No. 12 provided:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Possession of a
Dangerous Weapon by an Inmate, the state must prove each of the
following:
1. On or about May 10, 2011
2. in the state of Idaho
3. the defendant Gabriel Torres
4. while an inmate
5. of a [sic] the Canyon County Jail
6. did possess
7. a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a sharpened plastic eating utensil.
2

If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant guilty.
6

B.

The District Court Erred By Incorrectly Instructing The Jury On The Elements Of
Possession Of A Dangerous Weapon
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Torres acknowledges that no objection was made to

this jury instruction. Therefore, the claim raised is one of fundamental error. The Idaho
Supreme Court has set forth the standard of appellate review of unobjected-to error.

See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).

Pursuant to Perry, a defendant must

demonstrate that 1) one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights were violated; 2)
there was a clear and obvious error without the need for additional information not
contained in the appellate record; and 3) the error affected the defendant's substantial
rights, meaning that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome
of the trial proceedings. Id. at 226. Mr. Torres meets all the prongs of this test.
First, the alleged error is a violation of Mr. Torres' right to due process.
Mr. Torres was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon. 3

(R., pp.8-9.)

However, the elements instruction told the jury that a sharpened plastic eating utensil
was a dangerous weapon.

(R., p.146.) The jury was instructed to determine whether

Mr. Torres possessed "a dangerous weapon, to-wit a sharpened plastic eating utensil."
The term "to-wit" is defined as "that is to say" or "namely." (Black's Law Dictionary (9th
ed. 2009).) Thus the jury was instructed that a sharpened plastic eating utensil was a
dangerous weapon.

The instruction removed the State's burden to prove that a

sharpened plastic eating utensil was a dangerous weapon. Thus, giving this instruction
violated Mr. Torres's right to due process.

3

In 2011, Idaho Code Section 18-2511 provided:
Any inmate of a penal institution or jail who shall manufacture, deliver or
possess a controlled substance or a dangerous weapon is guilty of a
felony.
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The instruction thus removed an element of the crime which the State was
required to prove. "A trial court has the duty to properly instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the case before it." Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Gas. Ins. Co., 149
Idaho 299, 313 (2010). "If a jury instruction lightens the prosecution's burden of proof
by creating conclusive presumptions of guilt as to an element of an offense and requires
the accused to come forward with evidence to rebut that presumption, it is a violation of
due process." State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344,348 (1990) overruled on other grounds
by State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657 (2000); Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246
(1952); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).

In Sandstrom, the United States

Supreme Court found that, "a conclusive presumption . . . would 'conflict with the
overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which
extends to every element of the crime,' and would 'invade [the] factfinding function'
which in a criminal case the law assigns solely to the jury." Sandstrom v. Montana, 442
U.S. 510, 523 (1979) (reversing defendant's conviction, finding that a reasonable juror
could believe the instruction either created a conclusive presumption regarding intent, or
that it placed a burden on the accused to prove lack of intent and a reasonable juror
could easily have viewed such an instruction as mandatory).
A conclusive instruction violates the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that
the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the
instruction is unconstitutional. See id. In State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749 (2007),
the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the jury
instructions constituted non-harmless fundamental error where the instructions omitted
one of the elements of the offense.

144 Idaho at 749-750. The Court found that it

"cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the
8

same conclusion had it faced all of the statutory elements." 144 Idaho at 749. The
Anderson Court stated:

The United States Supreme Court has held that in criminal trials "the State
must prove every element of the offense, and a jury instruction violates
due process if it fails to give effect to that requirement."
State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho at 749 (internal citation omitted).

In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the United States Supreme Court stated:
"Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt
standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged." Id. at 364, (emphasis added). Further,
the Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized that "[a] statutory presumption that is
mandatory, i.e., that is conclusive proof of an element of the crime or that requires the
accused to present rebuttal evidence thereby shifting the burden of proof, is
unconstitutional." State v. Hebner, 108 Idaho 196, 200 (Ct. App. 1985).
Here, the jurors could reasonably have concluded that they were directed to find
Mr. Torres guilty of possession of a dangerous weapon if they found that he possessed
a sharpened plastic eating utensil.

Such an interpretation would have deprived

Mr. Torres of his right to the due process of law; thus, the instruction in this case was
unconstitutional. Thus, the error implicates one of Mr. T orres's unwaived constitutional
rights.
Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record. The law is clear that "the
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged."

The jury instruction is in the record, so there is no need for additional
9

information outside the record. Further, there is no evidence that the failure to object to
the instruction was a strategic decision, as Mr. Torres gained absolutely no strategic
advantage by giving the jury an opportunity to convict him for possessing a broken
eating utensil without requiring it to find that the object was, in fact, a dangerous
weapon. Further, trial counsel strenuously argued in his closing remarks to the jury that
the eating utensil was NOT a dangerous weapon. (Trial Tr., p.173, L.3 - p.175, L.25.)
Third, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings. While the jury heard evidence that Deputy Combs believed the object to
be a dangerous weapon (Trial Tr., p.145, Ls.20-23), the jury also heard evidence that
sparks were later being sold to inmates, and that the sparks could be kept in their cells. 4
(Trial Tr., p.151, Ls.20-24.) Further, Deputy Combs also testified that the point on the
sharpened spark handle was not any sharper than what would be found on the tine of
the intact spark. (Trial Tr., p.149, Ls.19-25.) However, because of the erroneous jury
instruction, the jury was left with the impression that it could convict Mr. Torres if it found
that he was in possession of a sharpened plastic eating utensil.
It was apparent from the jury instruction that the jury could convict Mr. Torres if it
found that he possessed a sharpened plastic eating utensil. This instruction is not only
different from the element of the statute under which Mr. Torres was originally charged,
but it removed the burden on the State to prove that the sharpened plastic eating utensil
was a dangerous weapon. The instruction therefore required the jury to find Mr. Torres
guilty if it found that he possessed the broken eating utensil.

At the time of the incident, inmates could use received a spark with their meal, but
then they had to return the item to be washed. (Trial Tr., p.150, L.23 - p.151, L.3.)
Deputy Combs testified that the sparks were collected after the meal so that they could
be washed and reused, not for security reasons. (Trial Tr., p.151, Ls.7-19.)
4
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Because the giving of this instruction violated Mr. Torres' right to due process,
and because he meets all three prongs of Idaho's fundamental error test, Mr. Torres'
conviction must be vacated.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Aggregate Sentence Of
Five Years, With Two And One-Half Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Torres Following His
Convictions For One Count Of Possession Of A Dangerous Weapon And One Count Of
Aggravated Assault
Mr. Torres asserts that, given any view of the facts, his aggregate sentence of
five years, with two and one-half years fixed, is excessive.

Where a defendant

contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Torres does not allege that
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse

of discretion, Mr. Torres must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id.

The governing criteria or

objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
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In light of Mr. Torres' rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing Mr. Torres to incarceration and by not retaining jurisdiction over
him. The district court failed to consider the fact that these were Mr. Torres' first felony
convictions, and that, with programming, Mr. Torres could likely be successful in the
community. (PSI, p.12.)
Mr. Torres has a good work history.

He was employed at Rocky Point

Construction for five years before that business closed. (PSI, p.10.) He has had fairly
regular employment since that time and was even a supervisor at his most recent job at
Ida Cold Packaging.

(PSI, p.13.)

Idaho recognizes that good employment history

should be considered a mitigating factor. See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982);
see also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982).

Another consideration that should have received the attention of the district court
is the fact that Mr. Torres has strong support from his family members. See State v.
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the

support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts). Mr. Torres is close to
both of his parents and his brother and they are very supportive of him. (PSI, p.8.)
Mr. Torres also has three young children, ages four, five and eight, and the youngest
two live with Mr. Torres and his mother. (PSI, p.8.) Mr. Torres shares custody of his
eldest child with the child's mother. (PSI, p.9.) Mr. Torres reported that his children are
what are important to him in life. 5 (PSI, p.12.) Mr. Torres wants to take care of his
children and be in their lives. (PSI, p.12.) He is distressed that he is incarcerated and
is unable to be there for his children. (PSI, p.12.)

Mr. Torres even stopped drinking alcohol because he wanted to "be a better dad."
(PSI, p.11.)

5

12

The facts of this case are somewhat similar to those in State v. Shideler, 103
Idaho 593 (1982), a case in which the defendant was convicted of robbing a bank using
a shotgun, after which, as he was making his getaway, he fired two shotgun blasts in
the direction of a pursing pickup truck being driven by the husband of one of the bank
employees. Id. at 594. In Shideler, the court modified the sentence from twenty years
to twelve years. Id. at 593. The court found it significant that this was Mr. Shideler's
first felony and "the defendant has accepted responsibility for his acts, and that his
family and employer have shown considerable interest in his future." Id. at 595. Here,
as in Mr. Shideler's case, these were Mr. Torres' first felony convictions.

(3/9/12

Tr., p.54, Ls.2-3; PSI, pp.2-6.) Like Mr. Shideler, Mr. Torres expressed regret for what
he did, especially the effect his actions had upon his family.

(PSI, p.12.)

Like

Mr. Shideler, Mr. Torres would like to be a productive citizen in the future. 6 (PSI, p.17.)
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender
should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal."

State v.

Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (1998) (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227 (1971)); see also
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The defendant in Hoskins pied guilty to two
counts of drawing a check without funds.

Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673.

In Nice, the

defendant pied guilty to the charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor. Nice,
103 Idaho at 90.

In both Hoskins and Nice, the court considered, among other

important factors, that the defendants had no prior felony convictions.

Hoskins, 131

Mr. Torres has only an eighth grade education and has never obtained his GED or
HSE; however, he wants to go to school. (PSI, pp.10, 12.) Mr. Torres' goals include
finding a job, going to school, getting his own place to live and being a better father.
(PSI, p.12.)
6
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Idaho at 673; Nice, 103 Idaho at 90. The Hoskins Court ultimately found that based
upon the nature of the offense and the absence of any prior serious criminal record, the
district court abused its discretion in imposing the sentence. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 675.
Mr. Torres did have several misdemeanor convictions but had no prior felony
convictions. (3/9/12 Tr., p.54, Ls.2-3; PSI, pp.2-6.)
Further, Mr. Torres expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for his acts.
(6/27/12 Tr., p.132, Ls.14-25; PSI, p.2.) Mr. Torres, in his PSI Questionnaire, wrote that
he felt "horrible" and "stupid" for the possession of a dangerous weapon charge. (PSI,
p.2.) He also wanted the court and his family to know that he was sorry for his actions
and behavior, and he asked the district court for a chance to participate in programming
so that he could stay out of prison and raise his kids. (6/27/12 Tr., p.132, Ls.15-25.)
Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant expresses remorse
for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593,
595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).

For example, in

Alberts, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some leniency is required when the

defendant has expressed "remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his
willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character." Alberts,
121 Idaho at 209.

In Shideler, Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the prospect of

Shideler's recovery from his poor mental and physical health, which included mood
swings, violent outbursts, and drug abuse, coupled with his remorse for his actions, was
so compelling that it outweighed the gravity of the crimes of armed robbery, assault with
a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.
Shideler, 103 Idaho at 594-95. Therefore, the court reduced Shideler's sentence from

14

an indeterminate term not to exceed twenty years to an indeterminate term not to
exceed twelve years. Id. at 593.
Even the presentence investigator concluded that Mr. Torres would benefit from
an opportunity to attend classes to address his poor decision making skills and potential
anger issues. (PSI, p.12.) The presentence investigator recommended that the district
court retain jurisdiction over Mr. Torres. (PSI, p.12.) While on a retained jurisdiction
program, Mr. Torres would have an opportunity to obtain either a GED or high school
equivalency.

(6/27/12 Tr., p.128, Ls.18-24.) Yet, the district court declined to retain

jurisdiction over Mr. Torres. (6/27/12 Tr., p.146, Ls.6-7)
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Torres asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him.

He asserts that

had the district court properly considered his family support, work history, and remorse,
it would have followed the recommendations of the presentence investigator and
retained jurisdiction over Mr. Torres so that he could complete the Idaho Department of
Correction programming. Alternatively, the district court should have imposed a less
severe sentence.

15

CONCLUSION
Mr. Torres respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for
possession of a dangerous weapon and remand that case for a new trial. Alternatively,
he requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems appropriate or remand his
cases to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 29 th Day of August, 2013.

LEY
)
SALLY J.
Deputy State Appellate Pdblic Defender
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